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WHEN “COMPREHENSIVE” PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENTS OVERLAP ADVERSE 
POSSESSION: SHIFTING THEORIES OF 
“USE” AND “POSSESSION” 
Will Saxe*
Abstract: Human nature dictates that private ownership of land creates 
conºict among neighbors. In the realm of adverse possession and pre-
scriptive easements, the law intervenes to settle these disputes. Adverse 
possession quiets conºict by providing the ripened possessor with title 
in fee simple absolute. In contrast, a prescriptive easement provides the 
holder with only a right of use. However, there are occasions when a 
prescriptive easement establishes a right of use so broad and encom-
passing that it amounts to a grant of de facto possession. Thus, such a 
“comprehensive prescriptive easement” enables the court to award the 
equivalent of possession while only requiring proof of mere prescriptive 
use. This Note examines the problems of comprehensive prescriptive 
easements, and explores possible solutions where rights of use are the 
equivalent of possession. 
Introduction 
 Inherent in the private ownership of land is conºict among neigh-
bors and users of real property.1 In the form of both adverse possession 
and prescriptive easement, the law intervenes to settle these disputes.2 
While adverse possession and prescriptive easements are related in 
many ways, each doctrine has a unique effect on private property 
rights.3 Adverse possession rewards the possessing party with fee simple 
absolute and formally severs possession from the original title holder.4 
In contrast, prescriptive easements establish only a right of use, as the 
                                                                                                                      
* Clinical Program Director, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2005–06. 
1 See 7 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition § 60.01, at 390 (David A. 
Thomas ed., 1994). 
2 See 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435; 3 Am. Jur. 
2d Adverse Possession § 1 (2002). 
3 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435. 
4 Id. 
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land owner retains full title of the property.5 However, there are times 
when a prescriptive easement may allow such a broad and encompass-
ing use that it grants a de facto right of possession.6 In what this Note 
terms a “comprehensive prescriptive easement,” the successful claimant 
earns a right of possession while only having to prove the right of use 
associated with the typical prescriptive easement.7
 This Note addresses the problems of comprehensive prescriptive 
easements and discusses methods that may counteract granting rights 
of use equivalent to possession in prescriptive easement cases. Part I 
provides an analysis of the required elements of adverse possession. 
Part II examines the necessary components of a successful prescrip-
tive easement claim. Part III introduces the concept and implications 
of comprehensive prescriptive easements. Lastly, Part IV examines 
possible judicial adaptations that may diminish the inequity stemming 
from a comprehensive prescriptive easement’s awarding of de facto 
possession without having satisªed the more stringent adverse posses-
sion requirements. 
I. Adverse Possession 
 Adverse possession, a doctrine grounded in history, allows the 
ripened possessor to acquire absolute title to property from the origi-
nal owner.8 Transferring full title through adverse possession began 
centuries ago in England.9 At ªrst, there was no need for remedial 
doctrines such as adverse possession because ownership of property 
had no value until it was possessed or seized.10 As property laws devel-
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 596 (Ct. App. 1975) (“An exclusive interest la-
beled ‘easement’ may be so comprehensive as to supply the equivalent of an estate, i.e., own-
ership.”) (emphasis added). 
8 See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession, supra note 2, §§ 1–2 (deªning adverse possession 
“as an actual and visible appropriation of property commenced and continued under a 
claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another”); 10 Thompson on 
Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 71–74. 
9 Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 Geo. L.J. 2419, 2421 
(2001). At one time, the original property owner in England had to prove that unripe 
adverse possession had begun after the coronation of Henry II in order to retrieve posses-
sion. 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 73. Later, this cut-off point 
was adjusted to the coronation of Richard I. Lastly, Henry VIII created a statute that ªxed 
a general time limitation of three score years before suit was barred. Id. § 87.01, at 71–74. 
10 See 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 72 (“If one was dis-
seised, if one lost possession, one lost the interest in the land.”). 
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oped, so did the concept of separating title from possession.11 This 
separation of owner and possessor complicated property ownership 
and interfered with clear title.12 Thus, adverse possession became a 
method to quiet title by prohibiting the original owner from asserting 
ownership without consideration of time.13
 As with any statute of limitations that beneªts the general wel-
fare,14 adverse possession is based on fundamental policy considera-
tions—the prevention of “stale claims” and providing repose to the 
parties.15 Originally, English statutes of limitations concerning land 
ownership served to identify certain points in time prior to which a 
party could not rely on evidence in support of title.16 By 1540, statutes 
of limitations employed the modern approach of identifying a set pe-
riod of time after which the original property owner was barred from 
bringing suit to regain title.17 The evolution of the statute of limita-
tions culminated in a 1623 statute that required a twenty-year period 
of possession for the purposes of quieting title and avoiding suits.18 
Today, adverse possession under American common law has adopted 
                                                                                                                      
11 See id. 
12 See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 Cornell L. 
Rev. 816, 819–20 (1994). 
13 Id. Generally, adverse possession is not a favored method for quieting title because, 
among other reasons, the claims are greatly contested, settlement is often impracticable, 
and with many title companies paying attorney fees through title insurance, there is little 
incentive to settle. Michael P. O’Connor, Adverse Possession—Alive and Well in the 1990s, N.Y. 
St. B.J., Jan. 1998, at 14, 15. 
14 See 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 86. 
15 Sprankling, supra note 12, at 819–20. 
 At some point, however, the true owner’s opportunity to challenge the 
possessor’s title must end. Delay decreases the availability and reliability of 
evidence; witnesses die, memories fade and documents are lost. Adjudications 
premised on such stale evidence are prone to error. Moreover, the possessor 
is ultimately entitled to “repose,” or freedom from the nagging concern gen-
erated by title insecurity. 
Id. at 819; see William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 860 (3d 
ed. 2000) (“If we had no doctrine of adverse possession, we should have to invent some-
thing very like it.”). 
16 16 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 91.01[1], at 91-4 to 91-5 (Mi-
chael Allan Wolf ed., 2000). 
17 Id. 
18 Id.; see 1623, 21 Jac., c. 16, §§ 1, 2. 
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this twenty-year lapse period.19 In addition to the common law, most 
states have passed statutes deªning the period of limitation.20
 Beyond the judicial justiªcations of quieting title and limiting 
suits, adverse possession progressed in the United States as a method 
to promote economic development by encouraging the productive 
use of land.21 Under adverse possession, the productive user of land is 
favored over the idle owner.22 In addition, the statute of limitations 
for adverse possession serves to quiet title, thereby encouraging de-
velopment.23 For property to successfully develop, security in title 
must exist.24 Without security and comfort in title, economic growth is 
hindered by the expense of securing property; this in turn limits the 
resources available for development of property.25 In addition, with-
out the ability to easily secure title, there is less incentive to accumu-
late private wealth through economic development.26
A. Required Elements of Adverse Possession 
 Several distinct requirements must be met by the possessor in 
order for adverse possession to ripen and compel the transfer of ti-
                                                                                                                      
19 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 75. 
20 Id.; e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 21 (2004). For a compilation of individual state 
legislation pertaining to adverse possession, see 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra 
note 1, § 87.01, at 77–86. 
21 Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have It Wrong, 29 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 939, 942 (1996) (“Again, our society’s traditional preference for the 
development of land appears. If the adverse possessor makes valuable use of land where 
the true owner does not, the law views the adverse possessor as more socially responsible 
and thus preferable to the true owner.”); Sprankling, supra note 12, at 874; see Stake, supra 
note 9, at 2435–36. Sprankling and Stake both examine whether the public policy consid-
erations surrounding adverse possession and land use are environmentally unsound or 
obsolete. Sprankling, supra note 12, at 884; Stake, supra note 9, at 2435–36. Importantly, 
legal scholars have begun to question the environmental impact of adverse possession and 
whether its encouragement of property development is outdated. See John G. Sprankling, 
The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1996) (declar-
ing that “the property law system tends to resolve disputes by preferring wilderness de-
struction to wilderness preservation”); William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Com-
ment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 Land 
& Water L. Rev. 79, 96 (1996) (“Incentives to render an increased use of land are no 
longer needed to open frontiers and provide for society.”). 
22 Latovick, supra note 21, at 942. 
23 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, in Per-
spectives on Property Law 190, 193–94 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). 
24 See id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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tle.27 The possessor must show: (1) actual possession that is;28 (2) hos-
tile or adverse;29 (3) open and notorious;30 (4) continuous;31 and (5) 
exclusive.32 Lastly, adverse possession does not ripen until the appli-
cable statute of limitations has been satisªed.33
1. Actual Possession 
 For adverse possession to ripen, there must ªrst be possession 
under the law of that particular jurisdiction.34 Generally, the adverse 
possessor acquires only those lands in his immediate and direct pos-
session.35 The requisite level of possession is achieved not through 
casual acts of ownership, but rather through signiªcant acts of domin-
ion that serve as an ouster to the true owner.36 Actual possession can 
be demonstrated through a variety of uses and other forms of occupa-
tion.37 Many forms of possession other than the traditional establish-
                                                                                                                      
27 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 139 (5th ed. 2002); 10 Thompson 
on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 75. 
28 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., 444 
So. 2d 105, 108 (La. 1983) (“‘Stated otherwise, the possessor without title is entitled to be 
maintained in possession only to the extent of the boundaries within which he proved 
actual, physical and corporeal possession.’” (quoting City of New Orleans v. New Orleans 
Canal, Inc., 412 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1982))). 
29 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139 & n.12; see, e.g., Shandaken Reformed 
Church of Mount Tremper v. Leone, 451 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 1982) (“When pos-
session is permissive in its inception, adverse possession will not arise until there is a dis-
tinct assertion of a right hostile to the owner and brought home to him.”). 
30 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., Goldman v. Quadrato, 114 A.2d 
687, 690 (Conn. 1955) (requiring open possession within adverse possession claims). 
31 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., Iowa R.R. Land Co. v. Blumer, 
206 U.S. 482, 484 (1907) (listing continuous possession as a required element for ripened 
adverse possession). 
32 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. 
Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Wyo. 1982) (ªnding that possession was not exclusive because 
neighboring cattle also grazed on the property in question). 
33 See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, 
§ 21 (2004). 
34 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.05, at 112. 
35 Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., 444 So. 2d 105, 108 (La. 1983); see 10 Thompson on 
Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.05, at 112. One exception to the requirement of actual 
possession is the doctrine of constructive adverse possession under color of title. See 
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 145–46. Through constructive adverse possession, 
an adverse possessor holding land under defective title while actually possessing only a 
certain portion of that parcel can acquire title to the full property once adverse possession 
ripens. E.g., John T. Clark Realty Co. v. Harris, 2 N.Y.S.2d 137, 141 (App. Div. 1938); see 
Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 145–46; 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra 
note 1, § 87.07, at 123–27. 
36 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.04, at 99–111. 
37 Id. § 87.06, at 120–21. 
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ing of residence38 may be sufªcient to satisfy actual possession, such as 
building structures39 or enclosures,40 and cutting timber.41 However, 
in determining actual possession, the primary factor is whether the 
activity in question is consistent with an act that would ordinarily be 
performed by the true owner for that particular parcel.42 Thus, the 
character of the land and its typical uses are of the utmost importance 
in establishing actual possession.43
2. Hostile or Adverse Possession 
 The requirement of hostile possession is a misnomer.44 Ill will or 
malice is not necessary to show that possession is hostile or adverse.45 
Instead, possession must merely be a claim of ownership—commonly 
called a claim of right—that is adverse to the original title holder.46 
While claim of right is clearly a mandatory element of adverse posses-
sion, there are differences among jurisdictions regarding what state of 
mind is required by the possessor.47 For example, Georgia,48 Indi-
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. § 87.04, at 107. 
39 Williams v. Rogier, 611 N.E.2d 189, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“For residential land, 
the presence of permanent improvements such as border fences or buildings which are in 
place during the entire statutory period can be sufªcient to establish adverse possession.”). 
40 Robin v. Brown, 162 A. 161, 163 (Pa. 1932) (ªnding a fence must be of substantial 
character to be sufªcient for adverse possession). 
41 See Drennen Land & Timber Co. v. Angell, 475 So. 2d 1166, 1172 (Ala. 1985) (hold-
ing that the act of selling timber constituted actual possession because the area was “pre-
dominantly timberland”). 
42 See Hand v. Stanard, 392 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Ala. 1980) (“Land need only be used by 
an adverse possessor in a manner consistent with its nature and character—by such acts as 
would ordinarily be performed by the true owners of such land in such condition.”). 
43 Id. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at § 21 (summarizing that adverse 
possession claims should be viewed in light of the location and nature of the property in 
question). 
44 See 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at § 43. 
45 Id. 
46 Calhoun v. Woods, 431 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Va. 1993). Hostile possession is the posses-
sor’s use of the property as his own. See id. In other words, his use must be as if he were in 
fact the true owner. Id. 
47 Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 739, 746–47 
(1986) (Noting that “[t]here are three positions that have existed in legal doctrine: (1) 
state of mind is irrelevant; (2) the required state of mind is, ‘I thought I owned it;’ (3) the 
required state of mind is, ‘I thought I did not own it [and intended to take it].’ These can 
roughly be thought of as the objective standard, the good-faith standard, and the aggres-
sive trespass standard.”). 
48 E.g., Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga. 1989) (“We hold that the 
correct rule is that one must enter upon the land claiming in good faith the right to do 
so.”). 
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ana,49 Iowa,50 and Oregon51 require that the adverse possessor have a 
good faith belief in ownership.52 This is illustrative of a judicial trend 
in adverse possession law whereby the possessor’s intent has become 
increasingly important in the court’s eyes.53 Courts appear less willing 
to allow adverse possession as a means of rewarding title to the unde-
serving, knowing trespasser.54 Regardless of the debate concerning 
intent, the bottom line when it comes to issues of hostile possession 
remains that the possessor’s actions must be inconsistent with claims 
of ownership by the true title holder or any other party.55
 Frequently, the issue of hostile possession rests on whether the 
possessor had the permission of the true owner.56 In fact, adverse pos-
session claims may be thwarted due to a jurisdiction’s reliance on a pre-
                                                                                                                      
49 E.g., Pennington v. Flock, 93 Ind. 378, 383 (1884). 
50 E.g., Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa 1982) (“We now conªrm that 
good faith, as explained in this case, is essential to adverse possession under a claim of 
right.”). 
51 Or. Rev. Stat. § 105.620(1)(b) (2003). 
52 Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse Possession in Oregon: The Belief-in-Ownership Require-
ment, 23 Envtl. L. 1297, 1300 & n.17 (1993). The author claims that the good faith stan-
dard is counter to the fundamental policy objectives behind adverse possession itself. See 
id. at 1321. For example, by adopting the good faith requirement, Oregon has ignored the 
more favored purpose of adverse possession—rewarding those who act as true property 
owners instead of passive title holders. Id. 
53 See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U. L.Q. 331, 332 
(1983). However, a judicial focus on good faith serves to complicate adverse possession 
matters by assigning to the courts the near impossible task of determining intent, which, 
due to the passage of time, usually results in mere speculation. Id. at 357; see Olson, supra 
note 52, at 1316. 
54 See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 332 (ªnding that most cases did not award title to 
the willful trespasser). 
The cases, taken as a whole, do not show that the adverse possessor must 
plead and prove that he acted in good faith. It is enough that the question 
may be raised under the rubric “claim of right.” But the cases do clearly show 
that the trespasser who knows that he is trespassing stands lower in the eyes of 
the law, and is less likely to acquire title by adverse possession than the tres-
passer who acts in an honest belief that he is simply occupying what is his al-
ready. 
Id. For a more detailed perspective on the question of good and bad faith within adverse 
possession, see Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to 
Professor Helmholz, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (1986); R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A 
Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 Wash. U. L.Q. 65 (1986). 
55 Strickland v. Markos, 566 So. 2d 229, 233 (Ala. 1990) (holding that there is no re-
quirement that the possessor intend to claim the property of another because such a re-
quirement would reward bad faith); see 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at 
§ 43. 
56 See Shandaken Reformed Church of Mount Tremper v. Leone, 451 N.Y.S.2d 227, 
228 (App. Div. 1982); 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession, supra note 2, at § 43. 
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sumption that possession of another’s property is done with permission 
of the owner.57 Regardless of the type of presumption employed, a suc-
cessful claim of hostile possession often hinges on whether the posses-
sor is acting as a true owner rather than as a tenant or licensee.58
3. Open and Notorious Possession 
 In addition to being adverse, the possessor’s actions must be 
overt actions of ownership that would alert the true title holder to an 
opposing claim of right.59 The public policy reason behind this re-
quirement is to provide notice of the adverse possession to the record 
title holder,60 and, in some cases, even to the general public.61 This 
stems from the fundamental policy argument that the title holder who 
has notice of another party possessing his land as a true owner, yet 
fails to act, should be prohibited from later contesting the adverse 
possessor’s claim of ownership.62 In sum, open and notorious adverse 
possession must be achieved through an unequivocal display of an 
opposing claim of ownership to the title holder or his agents.63
                                                                                                                      
57 Vezey v. Green 35 P.3d 14, 22 (Alaska 2001) (“‘There is a presumption that one who 
possesses or uses another’s property does so with the owner’s permission.’” (quoting Smith 
v. Krebs, 768 P.2d 124, 126 (Alaska 1989))). 
58 See id. at 23. 
59 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.07, at 127–28; see, e.g., Gold-
man v. Quadrato, 114 A.2d 687, 690 (Conn. 1955). 
60 Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22; Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman P’ship, 733 A.2d 984, 990–91 
(Me. 1999) (stating that open, visible, and notorious adverse possession is required in or-
der “to provide the true owner with adequate notice that a trespass is occurring, and that 
the owner’s property rights are in jeopardy”). 
61 See Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ind. 1937) (holding that posses-
sion “must be so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public”). This 
view, however, appears to be an extreme outlook because most issues of open and visible 
possession are determined based upon whether the record title holder was on notice. See 
Vezey, 35 P.3d at 22 n.24; Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 783 (Alaska 2000). 
62 Philbin v. Carr, 129 N.E. 19, 27 (Ind. App. 1920) (stating that when learning of an 
adverse claim of title, a true owner should protect his title or pursue an act of ejectment). 
63 Elliot v. West, 665 S.W.2d 683, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“Where, as here, actual 
knowledge of the record owner is not proved, the claimant must show an occupancy so 
obvious and well recognized as to be inconsistent with and injurious to the owner’s rights 
that the law will authorize a presumption from the facts that he had such knowledge.”) 
(emphasis added); 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.08, at 131; see, e.g., 
Alaska Nat’l Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Alaska 1977) (ªnding that the standard of 
knowledge is based on the constructive knowledge of what a dutiful land owner would 
have known). Some jurisdictions, however, have required actual knowledge for certain 
types of adverse possessions claims. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 459 S.E.2d 166, 168 (Ga. 
1995). 
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4. Continuous Possession 
 In order for adverse possession to ripen, it must be continuous 
throughout the entire statutory period.64 Probably more than any 
other element of adverse possession, the extent of continuity required 
depends on the nature and character of the possession and parcel.65 
The level of continuity required by a possessor is determined by 
evaluating how an “average” owner would use the property.66 In some 
cases, even seasonal usage can be considered continuous.67 For ex-
ample, in Burkhardt v. Smith the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found 
that regular use as a summer cottage was enough to establish con-
tinuous adverse possession.68 In contrast, merely intermittent or spo-
radic usage such as hunting, ªshing, or fruit picking will usually not 
be considered adequately continuous.69 When examining if a seasonal 
or similarly occasional use is sufªciently continuous, it is necessary to 
determine whether there is any indication of abandonment by the 
possessor.70 If there is no act of abandonment coupled with the intent 
to abandon, sufªcient seasonal use that comports with the character 
and nature of the property will be considered continuous.71
                                                                                                                      
64 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 21 (2004). 
65 See N.A.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Pafundi, 736 A.2d 780, 784 (Vt. 1999). 
66 Id. (quoting Darling v. Ennis, 415 A.2d 228, 230 (Vt. 1980)). Continuity may also be 
maintained through the doctrine of tacking, where adverse possession is passed from one 
party to the next in order to achieve the statutory requirements. 10 Thompson on Real 
Property, supra note 1, § 87.13, at 159. For tacking to be successful, privity between the 
parties must exist. Id. § 87.13, at 160. For a brief summary of tacking, see id. 
67 See Roche v. Town of Fairªeld, 442 A.2d 911, 917 (Conn. 1982). “With respect to the 
manner of continuous possession, ‘[t]he location and condition of the land must be taken 
into consideration and the alleged acts of ownership must be understood as directed to 
those circumstances and conditions.’” Id. at 917 n.11 (quoting Benne v. Miller, 50 S.W. 824, 
828 (Mo. 1899)). 
68 115 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Wis. 1962). 
69 Okuna v. Nakahuna, 594 P.2d 128, 132 (Haw. 1979) (“Infrequent visits to the prop-
erty to pick and gather fruits can hardly be said to constitute continuous possession or 
even possession at all.”). 
70 See Pease v. Whitney, 98 A. 62, 64 (N.H. 1916) (ªnding a break in farming of land 
did not necessarily constitute an indication of intent to abandon); Dukeminier & Krier, 
supra note 27, at 140 n.15. 
71 See Pease, 98 A. at 64; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 140 n.15. 
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5. Exclusive Possession 
 For an adverse possession claim to successfully ripen, the posses-
sor must have sole possession72 as a true owner would.73 The policy 
behind this requirement is that adverse possession must serve as an 
ouster of the legal title holder.74 The exclusion of others does not 
necessarily need to be absolute, but must rather be of the type and 
character that an average true owner would display.75
 As can be expected, exclusive possession can be a tough standard 
to meet.76 Actions that may appear to most neighbors as those of an 
exclusive owner may not be sufªcient for an adverse possession claim.77 
For example, in Pettis v. Lozier, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held 
that grazing livestock, planting trees, gardening, and posting “No Tres-
passing” signs were insufªcient to successfully prove exclusive adverse 
possession.78 Often, a basic indicator of exclusive possession is the pos-
sessor’s forceful halting of actions that originated on the property by 
outside parties prior to the commencement of adverse possession.79 In 
the eyes of the court, such afªrmative steps will likely be sufªcient to 
provide the necessary ouster for exclusive adverse possession.80
                                                                                                                      
72 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.09, at 133. Two or more parties 
cannot adversely possess the same parcel simultaneously and establish exclusive possession 
from one another. Philbin v. Carr, 129 N.E. 19, 28 (Ind. App. 1920). 
73 See, e.g., Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Wyo. 1982). 
74 Philbin 129 N.E. at 28; 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.09, at 
133. 
75 Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47, 53–54, 57 (Colo. 1989) (ªnding that the adverse pos-
sessor used the property as an average owner by parking cars, storing fuel, and hosting 
barbeques, while neighbors stored lumber on the parcel and their children played on the 
land, that use was not sufªcient). 
76 See Pettis v. Lozier, 349 N.W.2d 372, 374, 376 (Neb. 1984); Dukeminier & Krier, su-
pra note 27, at 140. 
77 See Pettis, 349 N.W.2d at 374, 376; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 140. 
78 349 N.W.2d at 374, 376; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 27, at 140. 
79 See Pettis, 349 N.W.2d at 374; Wiedeman v. James E. Simon Co., 307 N.W.2d 105, 106, 
108 (Neb. 1981) (holding possession to be exclusive where possessor ended the dumping 
of trash on the property). Note that the Supreme Court of Nebraska made this ruling only 
three years prior to ªnding that the possessor’s extensive actions in Pettis did not establish 
exclusivity. See Pettis, 349 N.W.2d at 374. Thus, prohibiting actions that occurred prior to 
the beginning of adverse possession appears to be fundamental to establishing exclusivity. 
See id.; Wiedman, 307 N.W.2d at 106, 108. 
80 Wiedman, 307 N.W.2d at 106, 108; see Pettis, 349 N.W.2d at 374. 
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B. Rights Acquired by Adverse Possession: Fee Simple Absolute 
 Prior to the lapsing of the statutory period, the adverse possessor 
can be ejected only by the true owner.81 Other than the true owner, 
the adverse possessor is secure in title against all remaining parties.82 
However, once all the requirements of adverse possession have been 
met throughout the entire statutory period, the possessor acquires 
full title in fee simple absolute.83 Therefore, ripened adverse posses-
sion not only protects the possessor from an act of ejectment by the 
original owner, it provides security from claims by all parties.84 Like 
any fee simple absolute, the new title is not lost by an abandonment of 
possession or any other failure to assert title.85 Furthermore, the ac-
quisition of title by the adverse possessor operates as a conveyance by 
warranty deed from the true owner.86 In sum, adverse possession re-
sults in fee simple absolute, what a buyer would expect to receive in 
any traditional conveyance.87
II. Prescriptive Easements 
 An easement is a property right that is broadly deªned as “a non-
possessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another” 
without interference from the possessor.88 Another deªnition states 
that easements are the right to enjoy the land of another.89 Prescrip-
tive easements are created through prescriptive use, which the Re-
statement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) deªnes as “a use that is adverse 
                                                                                                                      
81 See, e.g., Spring Valley Estates, Inc. v. Cunningham, 510 P.2d 336, 338 (Colo. 1973) 
(“In other words, from the beginning of his possession period, an adverse possessor has an 
interest in a given piece of property enforceable against everyone except the owner or one 
claiming through the owner.”). 
82 See id. 
83Id.; Stryker v. Rasch, 112 P.2d 570, 577 (Wyo. 1941) (stating that “when adverse pos-
session for the statutory period is held, the adverse possessor is vested with full, new and 
distinct title”). The general rule is that adverse possession does not ripen when the true 
owner is the state or federal government. Latovick, supra note 21, at 939. Despite this sov-
ereign immunity, states in some cases have failed to protect property from adverse posses-
sion. See id. at 939–40. 
84 Cunningham, 510 P.2d at 338. 
85 DeShon v. St. Joseph Country Club Vill., 755 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
86 Niederhelman v. Niederhelman, 336 S.W.2d 670, 676 (Mo. 1960). 
87 See Cunningham, 510 P.2d at 338. 
88 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2(1) (2000); see 7 Thompson on 
Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.02(b), at 392. 
89 Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass’n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552 N.E.2d 66, 73 
(Mass. 1990) (“An easement is an interest in land which grants to one person the right to 
use or enjoy land owned by another.”). 
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to the owner of the land or the interest in land against which the ser-
vitude is claimed.”90 Thus, much like adverse possession, prescriptive 
easements are born from activities—use as compared to the posses-
sion of land—that are without the consent of the true owner.91 
Whether through adverse possession or prescriptive easement, once 
these activities are sufªcient to create a ripened claim, an actual 
property right in favor of the actor is created without compensation to 
the original land owner for his severed or reduced property rights.92
 Like the law of adverse possession, the law of prescriptive ease-
ments is grounded in extensive history.93 At the end of medieval times 
in England, prescriptive easements were based on a theory of a “lost 
grant.”94 Before then, England had applied a statute of limitations that 
required proof of use stemming back to the coronation of Richard I in 
1189.95 When this task became difªcult, the presumption of a lost grant 
was created in order to easily quiet title; this allowed parties—after a 
certain period of time elapsed—to presume that longstanding uses of 
property had been authorized in a deed that was now missing.96 While 
this lost grant theory was initially accepted in American courts, it has 
been replaced by a statute of limitations and an acquisition of property 
theory.97 These theories are supported by the principles that produc-
tive use of land should be rewarded and repose should be provided to 
the user by preventing stale claims.98 Thus, the doctrine of prescriptive 
                                                                                                                      
90 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16(1). Prescriptive easements have 
an alternative deªnition as well: “a use that is made pursuant to the terms of an intended 
but imperfectly created servitude, or the enjoyment of the beneªt of an intended but im-
perfectly created servitude.” Id. § 2.16(2). 
91 See id. § 2.16(2). 
92 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 669–
70 (1988). Yet, some valid arguments for compensation within prescriptive easements may 
exist. Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 594 (Cal. 1984) (Reynoso, J., 
dissenting); infra Part IV.B. For an extensive discussion on the argument for ordering 
compensation in cases of prescriptive easements in general, see Darryl S. Cordle, Note, 
Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc.: Compensation for Prescriptive Easements, 19 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 111, 120–21 (1985). 
93 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. b; 10 Thompson on 
Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.01, at 72–74. 
94 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. b. 
95 Id. Because American courts could not require continuous use from 1189, modern 
prescription law developed as a remedy. David Casanova, Comment, The Possibility and 
Consequences of the Recognition of Prescriptive Avigation Easements by State Courts, 28 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. L. Rev. 399, 405 (2001). 
96 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes §§ 2.16 cmt. g, 2.17 cmt. b. 
97 See id. § 2.17 cmt. b. 
98 Id. The acquisitive-prescription theory is particularly compelling: 
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easements can accomplish many of the same fundamental concerns as 
adverse possession without fully transferring title.99
A. Required Elements of Prescriptive Easements 
 The requirements for a successful easement by prescription are 
quite similar to those of adverse possession.100 For a prescriptive ease-
ment to ripen, the use must be hostile or adverse,101 open and notori-
ous,102 and continuous.103 In addition, a prescriptive easement does not 
ripen until the applicable statute of limitations has expired.104 Lastly, 
although exclusivity is a factor in forming a prescriptive easement, it is 
not the same concept as developed in adverse possession law.105
1. Hostile or Adverse Use 
 For an easement by prescription to ripen, the use must be ad-
verse or hostile to that of the true owner, thereby indicating a claim of 
right.106 A use is considered adverse if it is inconsistent with the de-
sires of the owner to such an extent that, had he known of the use, he 
would have stopped it.107 Thus, any indication that the use was some-
how subservient or permissive to that of the owner prevents the estab-
                                                                                                                      
Because the uses that create prescriptive rights in these cases are not tortious, 
the results cannot be explained by statute-of-limitations theory. They can be 
explained, however, under the theory that use pursuant to an express or im-
plied agreement gives rise to an entitlement, if continued for the prescriptive 
period. 
Id. 
99 See id.; Latovick, supra note 21, at 942; Sprankling, supra note 12, at 819. 
100 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(vi), at 438. 
101 LaRue v. Kosich, 187 P.2d 642, 646 (Ariz. 1947) (“It is a recognized rule of law that 
where the use of a private way by a neighbor is by the express or implied permission of the 
owner, the continued use is not adverse and cannot ripen into a prescriptive right.”). 
102 Kayªrst Corp. v. Wash. Terminal Co., 813 F. Supp. 67, 73 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Under 
District of Columbia law, an easement by prescription will arise only if the claimant’s use of 
the servient estate is, among other things, open and notorious . . . .”). 
103 Baker v. Armstrong, 611 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ark. 1981) (requiring prescriptive use to 
be “continuous” for seven years). 
104 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(vi), at 438; see Mass. 
Gen. Laws ch. 187, § 2 (2004) (“No person shall acquire by adverse use or enjoyment a 
right or privilege of way or other easement from, in, upon or over the land of another, 
unless such use or enjoyment is continued uninterruptedly for twenty years.”). 
105 See 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.09, at 133; 25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 53 (2004). 
106 See LaRue, 187 P.2d at 646; 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, 
§ 60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 440. 
107 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 440. 
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lishment of a prescriptive easement because the use is not considered 
adverse.108
 When evaluating the hostile nature of the use in question, a ma-
jority of jurisdictions presume that the use is adverse to the wishes of 
the true owner.109 Some states apply a more moderate approach and 
only presume adversity once the open and continuous requirements 
are met.110 A minority of states have adopted a presumption of per-
missive use.111 Additionally, some states apply a presumption of per-
missive use depending on distinct variables, such as when parties are 
related112 or the land is wild, unenclosed, and uncultivated.113
 Yet a presumption of permissiveness may not be necessary, as 
courts often aggressively look for indications of permissive use.114 For 
example, in Chaconas v. Meyers, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals considered friendly exchanges between the claimant and the 
owner as evidence that the use was not adverse.115 Thus, like adverse 
possession, proving actions hostile or adverse to the true owner can 
be a formidable requirement.116
                                                                                                                      
108 See Hollis v. Tomlinson, 585 So. 2d 862, 863–64 (Ala. 1991) (ªnding that the use of 
a road was not adverse because claimants had asked permission to use on several occa-
sions). 
109 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g (2000); see Lunt v. 
Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953) (“Because of the presumption that the use of 
another’s land is adverse to him, the owner has the burden to show that the use was under 
his permission as distinguished from against it.”). For a more extensive summary on pre-
sumptions of use for purposes of prescription, see Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Ser-
vitudes § 2.16 cmt. g; 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(viii), 
at 441–43. For a limited discussion of presumptions of permission within adverse posses-
sion, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
110 See Chaconas v. Meyers, 465 A.2d 379, 380 (D.C. 1983); West v. Smith, 511 P.2d 
1326, 1333 (Idaho 1973) (“The general rule is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, 
uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to 
how the use began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of 
right.”). 
111 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g; see, e.g., West v. Slick, 
326 S.E.2d 601, 610 (N.C. 1985) (“The law presumes that the use of a way over another’s 
land is permissive or with the owner’s consent unless the contrary appears.” (quoting Dick-
inson v. Pake, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900 (N.C. 1974))). 
112 See, e.g., Martin v. Proctor, 313 S.E.2d 659, 662 (Va. 1984) (ªnding that a child’s use 
of a parent’s land is presumed to be permissive without notice of an unequivocal assertion 
of ownership). 
113 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(viii), at 442–43; see 
Carpenter-Union Hills Cemetery Ass’n v. Camp Zoe, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 196, 201–02 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1977). 
114 See Chaconas, 465 A.2d at 383. 
115 Id. 
116 See id. 
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2. Open and Notorious Use 
 Open and notorious use is required for prescriptive easements to 
ripen so that the true owner has notice of the adverse use on his 
property.117 Presumably, armed with the knowledge that his property 
was at risk, the owner would undertake an action of ejectment.118 Like 
adverse possession, the owner need not actually know of the use; 
rather, it is only necessary that the use be so open and visible that the 
title holder is presumed to have the constructive knowledge of a duti-
ful owner.119 The type of use that is considered open and visible to 
satisfy constructive knowledge depends on the nature and character 
of the property in question.120
 Open and notorious use can be a difªcult standard to achieve 
because seemingly substantial uses may not be sufªciently visible to 
the diligent owner.121 For example, in Tenn v. 889 Associates, the Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire found that the placement of port-
able air conditioners did not amount to open and visible use, partly 
due to the fact that they were placed twelve feet or more above the 
roof of the building.122 Likewise, in Maine Coast Heritage Trust v. Brouil-
lard, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled that occasional pas-
sage by foot for bird-watching could not be considered open for pur-
poses of establishing a prescriptive easement.123
3. Continuous Use 
 Like adverse possession, use must be continuous throughout the 
prescriptive period for a prescriptive easement to ripen.124 As ex-
pected, the extent of continuity required to establish a prescriptive 
                                                                                                                      
117 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. h (2000). In fact, this 
requirement is considered satisªed if the owner has actual knowledge—regardless of 
whether or not the use is open and notorious. Id. 
118 See id. 
119 Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296, 304 (Alaska 1985) (explaining that the adverse user 
“need not show that the record owner had actual knowledge of the adverse party’s pres-
ence. Rather, the owner is charged with knowing what a duly alert owner would have 
known.”). 
120 Id. 
121 See Me. Coast Heritage Trust v. Brouillard, 606 A.2d 198, 200 (Me. 1992); Tenn v. 
889 Assocs., 500 A.2d 366, 372 (N.H. 1985). 
122 500 A.2d at 372. 
123 606 A.2d at 200. 
124 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 187, § 2 (2004); Baker v. Armstrong, 611 S.W.2d 743, 
745 (Ark. 1981). As with adverse possession, the doctrine of tacking can be applied to es-
tablish continuity among subsequent users. See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servi-
tudes § 2.17 cmt. l (2000). 
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easement is highly dependent upon the nature and character of the 
use itself.125 Frequently, the primary concern in evaluating continuity 
is whether an interruption in use has occurred that signiªcantly inter-
fered with the user.126 Yet, like adverse possession, seasonal use can 
establish continuity in certain circumstances.127 For example, in Ward 
v. Harper, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that seasonal use for 
timber operations in a remote area was sufªcient for continuity.128 In 
contrast, in Veach v. Day, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia ruled that using a road only a few times a year for hunting was 
considered too sporadic to establish continuity.129
4. Issue of Exclusive Use 
 In deciding on the scope of a prescriptive easement, a court will 
determine if the easement pertains to public or private rights based 
upon whether the use is by discrete individuals or by the public as a 
whole.130 For example, in Burks Brothers of Virginia, Inc. v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia established many individual private pre-
scriptive easements for access to a mountain trail.131 By instituting sev-
eral private easements instead of one single public easement, the 
court found each private right independent of the others.132 In other 
words, because each individual user was able to establish an easement 
without relying on the use of other parties, instituting an easement for 
the public was not warranted.133 In contrast, a public easement is ap-
propriate if an individual’s use is insufªciently exclusive, but when 
combined with the use and enjoyment of others, compels the recogni-
                                                                                                                      
125 See, e.g., Ward v. Harper, 360 S.E.2d 179, 182 (Va. 1987) (“In determining continu-
ity, the nature of the easement and the land it serves, as well as the character of the activity 
must be considered.”). 
126 Voorhies v. Pratt, 166 N.W. 844, 845 (Mich. 1918) (holding that despite owner’s 
failed attempts to stop the ºow of a drainage easement, there was not a sufªcient interrup-
tion to ªnd a break in continuity). 
127 See Ward, 360 S.E.2d at 182. 
128 Id. 
129 304 S.E.2d 860, 863 (W. Va. 1983) (stating that the use “must be more than occa-
sional or sporadic” to be continuous). 
130 See 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(v), at 438. 
131 349 S.E.2d 134, 139 (Va. 1986). 
132 Id. (“Here, by contrast, there is no evidence of any use by the general public. Each 
landowner asserted his own right, independent of all others, to use the trail, and no rights 
were dependent upon the common enjoyment of similar rights by others.”). 
133 See id. 
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tion of a prescriptive easement.134 Private use will not be sufªcient to 
generate a private easement when it is combined with similar public 
use and there is no private act indicating the assertion of an exclusive 
individual right.135 In sum, the question of whether a public easement 
exists is often simply answered by examining “the character of the use, 
namely, whether or not the public, generally, have had the free and 
unrestricted right [of] use.”136 By examining the general character of 
the use, courts will reward broad communal-like uses with public 
rights while rewarding narrower individual uses with private rights.137
 In addition to being established by multiple private parties, the 
government can establish a public prescriptive easement.138 The Illi-
nois case of Town of Deer Creek Road District v. Hancock serves as a prime 
example of establishing a public easement by government action.139 
Deer Creek argued that the town had acquired a prescriptive ease-
ment for public use of a road located on the Hancock property, de-
spite claims by the Hancocks that the road was used only by their so-
cial guests, the occasional hunter, and those who serviced families 
living on the road.140 The town presented evidence that during the 
prescriptive period, it had undertaken great efforts in maintaining the 
road, such as digging ditches, building culverts, cutting grass, and 
plowing snow.141 The court found that once a party demonstrates pub-
lic use, a presumption of a public prescriptive easement exists, which 
the Hancocks failed to overcome.142
                                                                                                                      
134 See id. (“In such a case, the right of each user of the way is dependent upon the en-
joyment of similar rights by others, and no private prescriptive rights will arise.”). 
135 Simmons v. Perkins, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (Idaho 1941) (“The use of a driveway in 
common with the owner and the general public, in the absence of some decisive act on the 
user’s part indicating a separate and exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption 
of individual right therein in his favor.”). 
136 Town of Deer Creek Rd. Dist. v. Hancock, 555 N.E.2d 1147, 1149–50 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990). 
137 See id.; 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(v), at 438 (ex-
plaining that the primary test is the nature of the use, not the number of users). 
138 See Hancock, 555 N.E.2d at 1147–49. As with adverse possession, sovereign immunity 
protects government property against the ripening of prescriptive easements. 7 Thompson 
on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(iv), at 437. 
139 555 N.E.2d at 1147–49. 
140 Id. at 1148. 
141 Id. at 1147–48. 
142 Id. at 1149–50. 
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B. Rights Acquired by Prescriptive Easement: Rights of Use 
 Unlike adverse possession, a ripened prescriptive easement does 
not lead to a transfer in title;143 rather, a prescriptive easement leaves 
title with the true owner while reserving a use in the property.144 The 
title holder remains free to use his property as he wishes, so long as it 
does not interfere with the easement rights.145 Even if there is a later 
transfer of title by the fee simple owner, the easement remains.146 Ex-
amples of rights of use enabled through prescriptive easements in-
clude: the rights of way or passage;147 the right to access water or dis-
pose of waste through pipes;148 the right to place a mobile home on a 
neighbor’s land;149 the right to ºood the lands of another;150 the right 
to cut timber;151 and the right of aircraft to intrude into a private 
party’s airspace.152 These examples illustrate the central difference be-
tween prescription and adverse possession: while a prescriptive ease-
ment provides a distinct property right based on use, its holder does 
not gain full title.153
III. The Dilemma of Comprehensive Prescriptive Easements 
 As is evident by an explanation of their respective requirements, 
the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive easements are 
quite similar. Yet, as discussed above, a dramatic discrepancy exists in 
how ripened adverse possession and prescriptive easements affect 
property rights, with adverse possession resulting in fee simple abso-
lute, while prescriptive easements produce only a right of use.154 
However, in some instances, the right of use provided by a prescriptive 
easement may be so vast and encompassing that it is the equivalent of 
                                                                                                                      
143 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435. 
144 Id. 
145 Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. a (2000). 
146 See Riddock v. City of Helena, 687 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Mont. 1984) (“Further, pre-
scriptive title once established is not divested by transfer of the servient estate.”). 
147 Burks Bros. of Va., Inc. v. Jones, 349 S.E.2d 134, 139 (Va. 1986). 
148 Knight v. Cohen, 93 P. 396, 397 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1907). 
149 Johnson v. Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Iowa 2001). A more compelling claim may 
have been adverse possession since placement of the mobile home could be considered 
possession rather than use. See id. at 182 n.1. The court noted that although “resolution of 
this case seems to be most appropriate under the doctrine of adverse possession, neither 
party pursued this theory further than the initial pleadings.” Id. 
150 Mueller v. Fruen, 30 N.W. 886, 887 (Minn. 1886). 
151 Ward v. Harper, 360 S.E.2d 179, 182 (Va. 1987). 
152 Casanova, supra note 95, at 407–10. 
153 7 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 60.03(b)(6)(i), at 435. 
154 Id. 
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fee simple absolute.155 Thus, a successful claimant of a comprehensive 
prescriptive easement achieves possession while only having to prove 
the lesser rights of use associated with a prescriptive easement.156
 The case of Raab v. Casper illustrates how a prescriptive easement 
can have the same result as adverse possession.157 In a case of a mis-
taken property line, the defendants built part of their home, driveway, 
utility lines, and landscaping on a portion of their neighbor’s prop-
erty.158 The trial court had ruled that this amounted to a successful 
prescriptive easement for use of the driveway, utility lines, and yard.159 
The Court of Appeal of California reversed the holding, ªnding that 
the prescriptive easement granted rights equivalent to a transfer in 
title without having to meet the requirements of adverse possession.160 
The court provided the following reasoning for reversing the earlier 
ªnding: 
The [trial court’s] judgment declares that defendants are 
entitled to an easement for roadway and utility lines “to-
gether with an easement for the maintenance of lawn, 
fences, shrubs, fruit trees, and landscaping around the [de-
fendants’] house . . . .” Although adroitly phrased to avoid 
the language of a grant of title, the last-quoted clause was 
undoubtedly designed to give defendants unlimited use of 
the yard around their home. Defendants doubtless did not 
intend plaintiffs, owners of the nominal servient tenement, 
to picnic, camp or dig a well in their yard. They doubtless 
did not intend to own a house on one side of the boundary 
with an unmarketable yard on the other. The ªndings and 
judgment were designed to exclude plaintiffs from defendants’ do-
mestic establishment, employing the nomenclature of easement but 
designed to create the practical equivalent of an estate.161
                                                                                                                      
155 See Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 563, 568 (Ct. App. 1983), 
vacated, 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984); Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 596–97 (Ct. App. 
1975). “An exclusive interest labeled ‘easement’ may be so comprehensive as to supply the 
equivalent of an estate, i.e., ownership.” Id. at 596. 
156 See Warsaw, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 568; Raab, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 596–97. 
157 124 Cal. Rptr. at 596–97. 
158 Id. at 592, 596. 
159 Id. at 592–93, 596–97. 
160 See id. at 597. In fact, the possession in question did meet the higher standard for 
adverse possession with one exception: “The ªndings recite no exclusivity of use. For that 
reason alone, they will not support a judgment of adverse possession.” Id. 
161 Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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 The problematic nature of an easement that grants an all-
encompassing use is addressed by Richard R. Powell.162 Powell 
clariªes that an easement must only involve a “limited” use.163 Accord-
ing to Powell, when the use becomes all-encompassing of the prop-
erty, it ceases to be an easement: “If a conveyance purported to trans-
fer to A an unlimited use or enjoyment of land, it would be in effect a 
conveyance of ownership to A, not an easement.”164 Powell identiªes 
the crucial distinction between limited and unlimited uses: an ease-
ment can only exclude “the servient owner wholly from some speciªed 
uses of the servient land, as for example, the springs of water located 
thereon.”165
 The case of Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. serves as an-
other illustration of the dilemma posed by comprehensive prescriptive 
easements.166 Like many prescriptive easement cases, Warsaw involved a 
conºict among abutting landowners.167 Both parcels were purchased 
from a common owner in 1972.168 The plaintiffs built a commercial 
building with a driveway—alongside the defendant’s property—so that 
large trucks could access the loading docks.169 Shortly after the build-
ing became operational, it became clear that the driveway was not large 
enough to accommodate the trucks in order to access the loading 
docks without traveling on a vacant portion of defendant’s property.170 
On several occasions, plaintiffs were unsuccessful in attempts to work 
with the defendant in order to establish mutual easements over each 
other’s property.171 In 1979, the defendant began constructing a ware-
house on his property, including the portion used by plaintiffs.172 In an 
attempt to halt construction, plaintiffs sought and were denied an in-
junction.173 However, after completion of the construction, the trial 
                                                                                                                      
162 3 Richard R. Powell, The Law of Real Property ¶ 405, at 34-13 to 34-15 (Pat-
rick J. Rohan ed., 1992). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. Recall that the acquisition of title by the adverse possessor operates as a convey-
ance by warranty deed from the true owner. See Niederhelman v. Niederhelman, 336 
S.W.2d 670, 676 (Mo. 1960). 
165 3 Powell, supra note 162, at ¶ 405, at 34-13 to 34-15 (emphasis added). Note that 
the key distinction is between a whole use of the entire property versus a whole use of 
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court found that the plaintiffs held a prescriptive easement for the use 
of the trucks and ordered the defendant to remove the portion of the 
newly constructed building that interfered with the path of that ease-
ment.174 On appeal, the Court of Appeal of California—in a ruling that 
was later overturned175—remanded the case, ordering the defendant 
be provided adequate compensation for the loss of property rights suf-
fered as a result of the prescriptive easement.176 In support of its deci-
sion, the court explicitly focused on the possessory nature of the ease-
ment: 
 A simple afªrmance of the judgment would result in 
plaintiffs, who are admittedly trespassers, acquiring practical 
possession of a sixteen thousand two hundred ªfty (16,250) 
square foot parcel of defendant’s valuable property free of 
charge with the added damage to the defendant of the cost 
of relocating the building. 
 The doctrines of adverse possession and prescription purely 
and simply result in one person taking for his own use the pri-
vate property of another. While the distinction between ad-
verse possession and prescription lies in the fact that in the 
former fee title is acquired and in the latter simply a right in 
the land of another, the practical result is that in each case the 
true owner is divested of the right to make use of his land as 
he desires. The case at bench presents a classic example of 
that result.177
 While the order for compensation was later vacated for public 
policy reasons, Warsaw stands as another example of how prescriptive 
easements can culminate in de facto possession.178 Thus, the reason-
ing behind both the Raab and Warsaw decisions begs the question of 
how courts should respond when granting a prescriptive easement 
that would establish a right of use equivalent to ripened adverse pos-
session though the claimant has only satisªed the elements of pre-
scription.179
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IV. Some Traditional and Not-So-Traditional Methods to 
Counteract Comprehensive Prescriptive Easements 
 There are two logical methods to address the problem of com-
prehensive prescriptive easements: (1) make them harder to attain; or 
(2) apply tactics of mitigation once they are established.180 First, this 
Note examines the application of two variations of the adversity re-
quirement within the doctrines of adverse possession and prescription 
in some jurisdictions: a good faith requirement and a presumption of 
permissive use.181 Through the court’s implementation of the good 
faith requirement, a presumption of permissive use, or both, the user 
of land will face a greater burden in seeking a comprehensive pre-
scriptive easement.182 Second, this Note explores a much more radical 
alteration of the law of prescriptive easements: providing compensa-
tion to the true owner once a comprehensive prescriptive easement is 
established on his property.183 Compensation would provide an ap-
propriate form of mitigation for the servient estate title holder suffer-
ing from the severe loss in property rights that accompanies a com-
prehensive prescriptive easement.184
A. Impeding the Process of Adversity in Prescription: Arguments for a Good 
Faith Requirement and Presumption of Permissive Use 
 Comprehensive prescriptive easements reward the user with a 
right similar to possession without applying some of the more stringent 
requirements of adverse possession.185 For example, prescriptive ease-
ment holders obviously must only demonstrate use, and need not dem-
onstrate possession for the prescriptive period.186 Perhaps a solution to 
this incongruity between rights gained and elements proved stems from 
an application of two of the more rigorous adverse possession and pre-
scription requirements employed by various jurisdictions—a good faith 
belief in the right to use and a presumption of permissive use.187 This 
Note proposes that the problem of comprehensive prescriptive ease-
                                                                                                                      
180 See infra Part IV.A–B. 
181 See infra Part IV.A. 
182 See infra Part IV.A. 
183 See infra Part IV.B. 
184 See infra Part IV.B. 
185 See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 596–97 (Ct. App. 1975); 7 Thompson on 
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187 See West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 610–11 (N.C. 1985); Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 
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ments—the establishment of rights of possession without proving ad-
verse possession—would be curtailed by slightly modifying the prescrip-
tive easement doctrine to include these two additional elements.188
1. Good Faith Requirement 
 By requiring prescriptive users to prove a good faith belief in 
their right of use, the road to the comprehensive prescriptive ease-
ment would become more of an uphill climb.189 The major criticism 
of both the doctrines of adverse possession and prescriptive ease-
ments often stems from the principle that they constitute reward for 
trespass.190 Imposing a good faith requirement—a belief that one’s 
use is based in right and not trespass—would dampen the court’s ob-
ligation to reward such actions of trespass.191
 While the good faith requirement is usually applied only in situa-
tions involving constructive possession under color of title in adverse 
possession,192 it may be appropriate in limiting the scope of prescrip-
tive easements.193 A good faith requirement would serve to identify 
the truly “innocent” land users who, due to no fault of their own, are 
deserving of a prescriptive easement.194 In situations of comprehen-
sive prescriptive easements—where rights of use are the equivalent to 
possession—a good faith requirement would prevent the granting of 
de facto possession to someone other than the well-intentioned 
user.195 Only those users who believed their use was one of right and 
not trespass would be worthy of an all-encompassing grant of near 
possession.196 In other words, the good faith requirement would ac-
complish two functions: eliminate many of the claims for comprehen-
sive prescriptive easements and reward those very easements to only 
the most deserving and innocent claimants.197
 Certainly, the good faith requirement has substantial draw-
backs.198 A good faith requirement for adverse possession or prescrip-
                                                                                                                      
188 See infra Parts IV.A.1–2. 
189 See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 332. 
190 See id. at 340–41. 
191 See id. 
192 10 Thompson on Real Property, supra note 1, § 87.15, at 178. 
193 See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 332. 
194 See id. 
195 See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 596–97 (Ct. App. 1975); Helmholz, supra note 
53, at 332. 
196 See Raab, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 596–97; Helmholz, supra note 53, at 332. 
197 See Helmholz, supra note 53, at 332. 
198 See Olson, supra note 52, at 1316, 1321. 
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tion may undermine the public policy principles behind the doctrines 
themselves.199 For example, by impeding prescription, the good faith 
requirement does not always promote the quieting of title, nor would 
it always reward the productive use of land.200 The most pressing con-
cern is that the good faith requirement would saddle the courts with 
the burdensome task of determining the subjective intent of the land 
user.201 In comparison to the severe consequences suffered by the ser-
vient estate holder in comprehensive prescriptive easement cases, the 
added judicial burden is warranted.202 A more moderate solution is to 
apply the good faith requirement only to situations involving poten-
tial comprehensive prescriptive easements.203 If this tactic is adopted, 
critics’ concerns of a cumbersome judicial workload would be 
nulliªed since the problem is so uncommon that the seldom-
encountered burden would not cripple the courts.204 Thus, despite 
doctrinal and practical concerns, the good faith requirement—or at 
least the court’s ability to consider intent in a balancing of the equi-
ties—may be enough to compensate for the destructive effects of 
comprehensive prescriptive easements. 
2. Presumption of Permissive Use 
 Another remedy to the dilemma posed by comprehensive pre-
scriptive easements is a presumption of permissive use.205 By mandat-
ing a presumption of permissive use when evaluating claims of pre-
scription, those seeking easements will face a tougher evidentiary 
standard.206 To establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant must 
prove that the use was adverse to that of the true owner, forming a 
                                                                                                                      
199 Id. at 1321. 
200 Id. at 1298. However, recall that some public policy foundations for adverse posses-
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202 See Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. Rptr. 590, 596–97 (Ct. App. 1975); Olson, supra note 52, 
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205 See West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 610–11 (N.C. 1985) (quoting Dickinson v. Pake, 
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of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g (2000). 
206 See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g; see also, e.g., Slick, 
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tion in original)). 
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claim of right.207 When a presumption of permission exists, the claim-
ant must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence that the 
use was actually adverse to the will of the owner.208
 As with the requirement for good faith use, the presumption of 
permission would hinder many of those claiming comprehensive pre-
scriptive easements.209 Only those users who could furnish evidence 
that their use was truly inconsistent with the wishes of the owner would 
succeed.210 Thus, like the good faith requirement, the presumption of 
permission would enable courts to discard many less compelling claims 
of adversity while rewarding only worthy parties that demonstrate a use 
adverse enough to overcome the evidentiary burden.211 Furthermore, a 
presumption of permissive use comports with the view “that Americans 
are both neighborly and litigious” and therefore would have objected 
to any unauthorized use of their land.212 Lastly, unlike the good faith 
requirement’s query of subjective intent, the presumption of permis-
sion presents no additional burden to the court.213 In fact, a presump-
tion of permission may reduce the workload of courts by reducing the 
need to determine whether an owner has consented to the use in ques-
tion.214
 Nevertheless, a presumption of adverse use does advance several 
public policy objectives.215 For example, a presumption of adverse 
use—and its facilitation of prescription—is conducive to rewarding the 
productive use of land.216 However, as long as courts strictly enforce the 
open and continuous requirements, a presumption of adversity is not 
necessary because visible and prolonged use will be noticed and acted 
upon by the dutiful owner regardless of the presumption.217 Con-
versely, the problem of comprehensive prescriptive easements—and its 
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reward of de facto possession—would be alleviated by the courts estab-
lishing a presumption of permissive use, or at the very least, aggressively 
seeking indications of consent from ownership.218
B. Softening the Impact of Comprehensive Prescriptive Easements: The 
Argument for Compensation 
 Both adverse possession and prescriptive easements reward the 
productive use of land by providing the possessor or user with a sol-
idiªed property right.219 Traditionally, nothing within the law of either 
doctrine provides for the awarding of compensation to the aggrieved 
land owner.220 Thus, both adverse possession and prescriptive ease-
ments often produce clear winners and losers.221 While there are cer-
tainly strong arguments that compensation should not apply to the av-
erage prescriptive easement, this may change when the easement repre 
sents a use so comprehensive that it awards de facto possession.222
 Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc. discusses the argument for 
compensation in prescriptive easement cases.223 In afªrming the es-
tablishment of a prescriptive easement, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia then addresses the question of whether the land owner was en-
titled to compensation for the cost of relocating his building to 
accommodate the easement.224 In denying compensation, the court 
found that there was “no basis in law or equity” for requiring the 
holder of an easement to compensate the owner of the servient prop-
erty.225 The foundation for the court’s denial of compensation was 
two basic tenets of the doctrine of prescriptive easements: to reduce 
litigation in land disputes and to provide stability to individual prop-
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erty rights.226 Thus, the court was reluctant to overturn prescriptive 
easement jurisprudence by mandating compensation for the use of 
property.227
 However, the principle of compensation for prescriptive ease-
ments may be more appropriate when, unlike Warsaw, the use in 
question is comprehensive, nearing full possession of the entire prop-
erty.228 In Warsaw, there was no indication that the establishment of 
the prescriptive easement left the defendant’s property with no alter-
native commercial use.229 However, had the easement consumed 
nearly the entire parcel and resulted in a loss of much of the prop-
erty’s commercial value—resembling a comprehensive prescriptive 
easement—valid arguments for mitigation would exist.230
 In its decision to deny compensation for the easement, the War-
saw court may have incorrectly relied on the underlying principles 
behind the doctrine of prescriptive easements—to reduce litigation 
and stabilize property rights.231 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rey-
noso offers support for mitigation because contrary to the goal of re-
ducing litigation, the doctrine of prescriptive easements actually in-
creases litigation by forcing land owners to bring suit when a trespass 
has occurred.232 Thus, mitigation can soften the blow suffered by the 
title holder and reduce further litigation as owners of servient estates 
are less likely to contest prescriptive easements once compensated.233 
Furthermore, providing compensation would be unlikely to increase 
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litigation because easement disputes are based upon a conºict in 
property use with compensation only being an afterthought.234
 Contrary to the beliefs of the Warsaw majority, ordering compen-
sation for an easement would not create instability in property be-
cause the newly acquired rights of the easement holder would not be 
weakened; rather, the holder would merely be required to compen-
sate the title holder.235 In his dissent, Justice Reynoso further states 
that the traditional formation of prescriptive easements may be out-
dated: “modern society evidences a preference for planned use, not 
the ad hoc use of a trespasser. It is questionable that in the urban set-
ting of the case at bench, such use by the trespasser is preferred by 
society.”236 This analysis comports with that of other scholars who have 
suggested that adverse possession—and perhaps also prescription— 
might be obsolete because of its impact on the environment through 
encouraging development.237
 Compensation for comprehensive prescriptive easements also 
appears to be a reasonable method of mitigation because it is based 
on equity.238 In Warsaw, the Supreme Court of California acknowl-
edged that prescription theory may be outdated, but failed to apply its 
powers of equity.239 However, prior California decisions provided 
compelling arguments for the application of equity: (1) equity allows 
for the court to adapt to each case and the new rights and wrongs that 
arise from it;240 (2) equity can be applied without a foundation in 
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precedent;241 and (3) equity provides the court with ºexibility in deal-
ing with novel claims.242
 Thus, while compensating for comprehensive prescriptive ease-
ments may be a novel pursuit and stands opposed to centuries of ju-
risprudence, it appears to be a reasonable method of mitigation.243 
Compensation would preserve the underlying principles behind pre-
scription while potentially adapting to modern concerns such as envi-
ronmentally sound land use.244 In addition, application of equity 
would allow for just compensation that adequately balances the rights 
and the wrongs of both parties in comprehensive prescriptive ease-
ment cases.245
Conclusion 
 Adverse possession and prescriptive easements serve to settle 
land disputes through the redistribution of property rights. A thor-
ough evaluation of their respective requirements reveals many simi-
larities. However, only adverse possession—with the greater eviden-
tiary burden of proving possession—results in a complete transfer of 
title. Yet, while intended to grant a mere right of use similar to any 
other easement, the comprehensive prescriptive easement establishes 
a right of use so vast and encompassing that it awards de facto posses-
sion. This new property right is troubling because a comprehensive 
prescriptive easement rewards the successful claimant with a right of 
near possession without the application of the more stringent re-
quirements of adverse possession. 
 Two relatively subtle alterations to the adversity requirement of 
prescription will lessen the dilemma of comprehensive prescriptive 
easements. First, rather than being forced to reward trespass, the uni-
versal adoption of a good faith requirement will enable courts to 
grant prescriptive easements to only the “innocent” land users. Sec-
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ond, a presumption of permissive use will ensure that the courts 
award property rights to only the worthy users of land who can prove 
their use was against the will of the owner. By impeding the process of 
proving adversity, these two modiªcations will allow the granting of 
comprehensive prescriptive easements—and easements in general— 
to only those parties worthy of gaining a signiªcant new property 
right. 
 Finally, once a court grants a comprehensive prescriptive ease-
ment, compensating the aggrieved land owner serves as a fair and equi-
table method for mitigation. While certainly a radical concept within 
the doctrines of both adverse possession and prescription, compensa-
tion for only comprehensive prescriptive easements represents a fair 
solution that acknowledges the property rights of both parties. 
 Thus, the adaptations discussed above represent both subtle and 
radical methods in dealing with the challenge posed by comprehen-
sive prescriptive easements. An assessment of these alternatives reveals 
both strengths and limitations regarding public policy and practical 
concerns. At the very least, this examination of comprehensive pre-
scriptive easements may prove useful in forcing courts to acknowledge 
the inequity of awarding a right of de facto possession while requiring 
only proof of prescriptive use. 
